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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether financial statement comparability
(hereafter referred to as comparability) is associated with corpor-
ate tax avoidance. We document the negative relationship
between comparability and tax avoidance. Our findings indicate
that comparability reduces information asymmetry, which makes
the monitoring of managerial activities more effective. In addition,
comparable information may increase the risk of detection of
aggressive tax strategies, which leads to reputational, regulatory
and political risks. We further examine how analyst coverage and
product market competition influence the relationship between
comparability and corporate tax avoidance. The results show that
analyst coverage substitutes for the effect of comparability on tax
avoidance. However, we do not obtain any conclusive evidence
that product market competition plays a complementary role to
comparability in reducing tax avoidance. Our results are robust to
the various measures of comparability and tax avoidance and
alternative methodological techniques.
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1. Introduction
The immense importance of taxes due to their role in economic development and
public welfare has made tax research imperative (Streimikiene, Raheem Ahmed,
Vveinhardt, Ghauri, & Zahid, 2018). The academic and public interest in tax avoid-
ance has increased in recent years. Public pressure (Dyreng, Hoopes, & Wilde, 2016)
coupled with strong media attention1 has also placed corporate tax avoidance under
the spotlight2. Recently, policy makers around the world have intensified their efforts
to curb tax avoidance3,4. Corporate tax avoidance has repercussions for business
(Lazar & Istrate, 2018) and society. Tax avoidance affects corporate reputations
(Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, & Shroff, 2014), future profitability (Katz, Khan, &
Schmidt, 2013), firm values (Chang, Hsiao, & Tsai, 2013; Chang et al., 2013), stock
CONTACT Chao Yan chaoyan@zuel.edu.cn
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA
2019, VOL. 32, NO. 1, 1813–1843
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1640627
prices (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009) and the costs of capital (Lim, 2011; Cook, Moser, &
Omer, 2017). From a societal viewpoint, corporate tax avoidance may obstruct the
financing of projects that are essential for society (Slemrod, 2004). Therefore, tax
avoidance may result in potentially irreversible losses to society. The importance of
taxes has increased the values of factors that contribute to tax avoidance.
Prior calls for research into the determinants of tax avoidance (Hanlon &
Heitzman, 2010; Shacklford & Shevlin, 2001) have yielded a growing body of research
that documents various factors that influence corporate tax avoidance. For example,
preceding research documents that customer concentration (Huang, Lobo, Wang, &
Xie, 2016), the composition of the board of directors (Lanis & Richardson, 2011),
corporate governance (Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 2015), political con-
nections (Kim & Zhang, 2016), debt maturity (Platikanova, 2017), competitive pres-
sure (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, & Omer, 2015), analyst coverage (Allen, Francis, Wu,
& Zhao, 2016), financial reporting (Frank, Lynch, & Rego, 2009), a military back-
ground (Law & Mills, 2016) and other factors affect the level of tax avoidance in
firms. Prior studies (Chen, Hong, Kim, & Ryou, 2017; Frank et al., 2009; Gallemore
& Labro, 2015; Hope, Ma, & Thomas, 2013) have linked the financial reporting of
firms with corporate tax avoidance. However, the impact of financial statement com-
parability, which is a vital feature of financial reports, on corporate tax avoidance has
been largely ignored. In this study, we attempt to close this gap in the literature and
examine the effect of comparability on tax avoidance.
Comparability is a key and unique aspect of financial reporting. Investors make
investment decisions after evaluating all of the available (investment) options.
However, the evaluation of the economic performance of firms becomes easier when
financial statements are comparable. Financial Accounting Standards Boards (2010)
defines comparability as ‘the quality of information that enables users to identify
(the) similarities and differences between two sets of economic phenomena’.
Comparability is a qualitative aspect of financial reporting, which means that ‘like
things looking alike and different things looking different’ (Barth, 2013). Higher com-
parability results in lower information acquisition and processing costs and increases
the quality and quantity of available information regarding the firm (Choi, Choi,
Myers, & Ziebart, 2017; De Franco, Kothari, & Verdi, 2011; Kim, Li, Lu, & Yu, 2016;
Kim, Kraft, & Ryan, 2013; Shane, Smith, & Zhang, 2014). Therefore, higher compar-
ability is associated with higher financial reporting transparency and lower informa-
tion asymmetry.
Lower information asymmetry and information uncertainty arising from higher
comparability reduces the efforts that are needed to monitor the managerial activities
(the stewardship role of accounting information). The stewardship role of accounting
in the monitoring of managerial activities is well-documented in the preceding
research (e.g., Ball 2006; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Pinnuck 2012;
Br€uggemann, Hitz, & Sellhorn, 2013). As the monitoring of managerial activities
becomes easier, the costs of opportunistic behaviour exceed the benefits and reduce
agency conflict. Zimmerman (2015) suggests that the stewardship role of accounting
facilitates resolving the conflict of interests between creditors, owners and managers
through better monitoring. Prior studies have suggested that tax avoidance is lower
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when managerial opportunism and agency costs are lower (Desai & Dharmapala,
2009; Chyz & White, 2014). We argue that higher comparability, by reducing infor-
mation asymmetry, improves the monitoring of managerial activities which, in turn,
lowers tax avoidance. Furthermore, higher transparency and lower information acqui-
sition and processing costs expose the firm to other stakeholders (such as regulators,
analysts, and interest groups). Since information acquisition is easier, it increases the
chances of detecting tax avoidance. The revelation of tax avoidance increases the
potential regulatory, reputational, political and litigation risks that are associated with
aggressive tax strategies (Chen et al., 2010; Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 2013; Graham
et al., 2014; Gallemore et al., 2014). A higher reputational5, regulatory, litigation and/
or political risk6’7 increases the costs of tax avoidance compared to the benefits and
consequently discourages such activities. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship
between comparability and tax avoidance.
Bases on these premises, we examine the effect of comparability on corporate tax
avoidance. We further examine how analyst coverage and product market competi-
tion influence the relationship between comparability and corporate tax avoidance.
Preceding studies suggest that analyst coverage (Allen et al., 2016) and product mar-
ket competition (Cai & Liu, 2009; Kubick et al., 2015) influence the tax avoidance
behaviours of firms. Our study seeks to answer following questions. How is compar-
ability related to tax avoidance? What is the effect of competition on the relationship
between comparability and tax avoidance? How does analyst coverage affect the rela-
tionship between comparability and tax avoidance?
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study contrib-
utes to the literature on comparability, particularly on how financial reporting influ-
ences corporate (tax) activities. We hypothesise and document and that
comparability negatively influences corporate tax avoidance. Our findings show that
higher comparability reduces information asymmetry, which makes the monitoring
of managerial activities more effective. In addition, more comparable information
may increase the reputational, regulatory or political risks associated with such
activities. Unlike the majority of the preceding literature on the effect of compar-
ability on investor decisions, our study examines the effect of reduced information
asymmetry on managerial/corporate decisions. Second, this paper answers the call
to research the determinants of corporate tax avoidance (Shacklford & Shevlin,
2001; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Although, prior literature has documented the
relationship between financial reporting and tax avoidance (Chen et al., 2017; Frank
et al., 2009; Hope et al., 2013), these studies have largely ignored the qualitative
aspect of financial reporting (i.e., comparability). Therefore, our study fills this gap
and hypothesises and documents the relationship between comparability and tax
avoidance. Third, we document how analyst coverage and product market competi-
tion affect the relationship between comparability and competition. This approach
may help to elucidate how competitive pressure and higher number information
intermediaries (analysts) influence the relationship between comparability and
tax avoidance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional
background, considers the related theories and develops the hypotheses. Section 3
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details the research methodology. Section 4 reports the regression results, while sec-
tion 5 provides the robustness check. Section 6 presents the paper’s conclusions.
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development
2.1. Institutional background
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 by the Communist
Party, the central planning system was adopted, which continued until 1978 when
economic reforms were introduced. During the period of central economic planning,
most Chinese firms were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These SOEs were required
to transfer all surpluses to the controlling government agencies. Since there were no
corporate profits, there was no corporate tax planning. A number of corporate tax
reforms were announced after the adoption of the famous open door policy by Deng
Xiaoping. The first corporate tax law was enacted in 1980 for foreign investments,
while corporate tax laws for SOEs were introduced in 1984 (Cai & Liu, 2009). The
SOEs were divided into two categories based on their size. Large SOEs had an income
tax rate of 55%, while small SOEs were subjected to a tax that ranged from 10% to
55%. These regulations were called the Provisional Regulations on Income Tax for
SOEs and the Provisional Regulations on Income Tax for Collectively Owned Firms,
respectively. Similarly, the Provisional Regulations on Income Tax for Private Firms
were introduced in which a tax rate of 55% was set for private firms.
The taxation system was revamped in 1994 in continuation of economic reforms
with the introduction of the Corporate Income Tax Codes. According to these rules,
all of the firms, irrespective of their ownership, were to pay taxes at a rate of 33%.
However, certain tax incentives and tax discounts were provided by local and central
governments in order to boost growth in some regions/industries. For instance, firms
in the western parts of China were subject to a tax rate of 15% for a certain period
(Wong, Lo, & Firth, 2015). Moreover, to promote investments in certain industries
(promoted by the government), newly established/listed firms were given a tax holi-
day for their first two years and a 50% tax reduction in their subsequent three years.
More reforms were introduced in 2007 (effective as of January 1, 2008) by the
authorities and a unified tax system was introduced for local and foreign firms. A sin-
gle tax rates of 25% was set for all the firms in order to smooth and simplify the tax
collection process.
2.2. Hypothesis development
2.2.1. Comparability and tax avoidance
Comparability has been considered as a tool to reduce information asymmetry.
Preceding research suggests that comparable information enhances both the quantity
and quality of information by decreasing the information acquisition and processing
costs (De Franco et al., 2011; Brochet, Jagolinzer, & Riedl, 2013). Higher comparabil-
ity reduces the time and efforts that are required for the processing of relevant infor-
mation by investors and hence the incentives to collect private information decreases.
Furthermore, higher comparability not only reduces information asymmetry but also
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lowers information uncertainty (S. Kim et al., 2013). Prior studies document numer-
ous benefits of comparability. DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li (2011) suggest that higher
comparability results in higher analyst following and more precise analysts’ forecasts.
Kim et al. (2013) discover a negative relationship between comparability and credit
risk, which can be attributed to lower information risk.
Lower information asymmetry induced by comparability also reduces the costs of
capital (Imhof, Seavey, & Smith, 2017; Shane et al., 2014). Shane et al. (2014) argue
that higher comparability lowers underpricing near/around seasoned equity offerings
(SOE), and there is a lower likelihood of losses from post-issue underpricing.
Furthermore, these researchers also report a positive relationship between comparability
and a firm’s long-run performance following an SOE when comparability is higher.
Prior research also finds that comparability increases the availability of firm-specific
information and boosts the flow of valuable, relevant information, which leads to highly
informative stock prices (Choi et al., 2017). When information processing becomes eas-
ier (higher comparability), the costs to hold bad news outweigh the benefits, and it
thus decreases the expected stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2016) and increases firm
value (Neel 2017). Chen, Collins, Kravet, and Mergenthaler (2018) document that com-
parability also facilitates capital allocation by enabling investors to make better acquisi-
tion decisions. Higher firm-specific information helps in understanding and
pinpointing the underlying economically risky areas for further scrutiny. The availabil-
ity of higher firm-specific information also helps in better acquisition decisions, particu-
larly in an environment where information asymmetry is higher. Higher comparability
renders the managerial use of capital easier, and it becomes easier for investors to infer
the true economic performance of a firm (Habib, Hassan, & Al-hadi, 2017).
Taxes take a large sum of money from shareholders and transfer it to the state.
Avoiding taxes can increase the wealth of the shareholders. However, such activities
may bring costs along with benefits. These costs may take the form of reputational
losses and/or regulatory, litigation, political and agency risks (Hanlon & Slemrod,
2009; Graham et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2013; Lim 2011; Cook et al., 2017; Slemrod
2004; Dyreng et al., 2016). Prior studies suggest that tax avoidance results in man-
agerial rent extraction (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009) and
reduces firm value. The negative association between tax avoidance and firm value
may be attributed to managerial opportunism and agency slack, and higher organisa-
tional complexity (Khurana & Moser, 2013) results from tax avoidance. Tax avoid-
ance not only exacerbates the agency conflict between managers and shareholder, but
it also facilitates the wealth expropriation by majority shareholders because it
increases tunneling (Tang, 2016). The positive association between tax avoidance and
agency costs has also been documented in Chinese settings (Chen, Li, & Ma, 2014).
However, in the presence of appropriate governance mechanisms, the managerial
opportunism decreases, which lowers the tax avoidance. Lanis and Richardson (2011)
suggest that board independence improves the corporate governance mechanisms and
reduces tax aggressiveness. Similarly, Jimenez-Angueira (2018) documents that tax
avoidance in firms with previously weak governance systems decreases when external
monitoring improves. These studies suggest that a governance mechanism that curbs
managerial opportunism may result in lower tax avoidance.
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Tax avoidance is a risky endeavour, since it increases legal, reputational and polit-
ical risks (Hasan, Kim, Teng, & Wu, 2015). Rego and Wilson (2012) argue that share-
holders recognise that tax avoidance’s risky nature may endanger a firm’s survival.
Therefore, when there is a separation of management and ownership, managers may
be willing to take the risks arising from tax avoidance. However, a higher level of
managerial ownership reduces tax avoidance (Badertscher et al., 2013). The lower tax
avoidance due to higher managerial ownership may be attributed to the lower risk
tolerance of owner/managers. Doellman, Huseynov, Nasser, and Sardarli (2017a)
argue that socially responsible investors withdraw their investments from firms that
are involved in greater tax avoidance due to reputational risks. The higher risks asso-
ciated with tax avoidance also results in a lower level of investments from mutual
funds, which leads to undervaluation (Doellman, Huseynov, Nasser, & Sardarli,
2017b). Therefore, tax avoidance increases the risks for the firm and may have con-
siderably higher costs than benefits.
Preceding studies also propose that opacity and complexity in the corporate finan-
cial information environment also affects tax decisions. The opaque financial report-
ing environment increases the organisation complexity (Robert Bushman, Chen,
Engel, & Smith, 2004), which facilitates tax avoidance. Frank et al. (2009) report a
negative association between upward earnings management (aggressive financial
reporting) and aggressive tax reporting. Kerr (2012) documents that an opaque infor-
mation environment increases tax avoidance. However, when relevant information
can be accessed easily and the information acquisition costs are lower, it reduces tax
avoidance, particularly in higher information asymmetry settings. Therefore, an opa-
que information environment may lead to higher tax avoidance.
We argue that lower information asymmetry and information uncertainty arising
from higher comparability reduce the efforts that are needed to monitor the manager-
ial activities (i.e., the stewardship role of accounting information). The stewardship
role of accounting in the monitoring of managerial activities is also well documented
in preceding research (e.g., Ball 2006; Beyer et al., 2010; Pinnuck 2012; Br€uggemann
et al., 2013). Zimmerman (2015) suggests that the stewardship role of accounting
facilitates resolving the conflicts of interest between creditors, owners and managers
through better monitoring. As the monitoring of managerial activities becomes easier,
the costs of opportunistic behaviours exceed the benefits, reduce the agency conflict
and lower the tax avoidance (monitoring view). Furthermore, higher comparability
reduces the costs of capital (Kim et al., 2013), which leads to lower financing con-
straints and decreases the managerial incentives for tax avoidance. Second, when
more comparable information is available, then the information asymmetry and the
complexity of business transactions are reduced. Kerr (2012) argues that higher infor-
mation asymmetry makes tax avoidance easier. Therefore, when comparability is
higher, information asymmetry decreases and tax avoidance becomes riskier in the
wake of political, reputational and legal implications (the risk view). Therefore, firms
would avoid engaging in these risky activities when comparability is higher. This dis-
cussion suggests that higher comparability reduces tax avoidance through better mon-
itoring and increasing the risks associated with such activities. Based on these
premises, we present following hypothesis:
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H1: Financial statement comparability is negatively associated with corporate
tax avoidance.
2.2.2. Comparability, analyst coverage and tax avoidance
Financial analysts play a vital role in the production and dissemination of informa-
tion (Bushman, 1989), which leads to their increased awareness of firms (Bowen,
Chen, & Cheng, 2008). Analysts are an important source of private information that
leads to lower information asymmetry and hence better monitoring of management
activities (Healy & Palepu, 2001). The monitoring role (monitoring view) of analysts
has been documented in prior research (Sun & Liu, 2011). This line of inquiry sug-
gests that higher analyst coverage curtails managerial opportunism (Chen, Harford, &
Lin, 2015; Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010; Irani & Oesch, 2013; Yu, 2008) and
improves corporate governance. Zhang, Tong, Su, and Cui (2015) further suggest that
higher analyst coverage also increases firms’ involvement in such activities, which
improves their respective corporate reputation (such as through corporate philan-
thropy). These studies suggest that analyst coverage decreases information asymmetry,
deters managerial opportunism and increases the visibility of the firm.
The nexus of analyst forecasts and tax avoidance is also built on the premises of
the monitoring view and reputational risk view. As previously discussed, higher ana-
lyst coverage improves the flow of information and facilitates the monitoring of man-
agerial activities, which results in lower managerial involvement in such activities that
lead to rent extraction such as tax avoidance (Chen & Lin, 2017). Furthermore,
higher analyst coverage also increases the reputational risk (Allen et al., 2016). A
firm’s reputation is at stake if its involvement in tax avoidance-related activities
becomes public knowledge (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009). The analyst coverage increases
the investor’s awareness regarding the firm. The analysts, along with other aspects,
also discuss corporate tax strategies (risks) in their reports. As analyst coverage
increases, the awareness of the tax strategies (risks) also increases and can lead to
hyper media attention, which results in reputational loss (Allen et al., 2016). Hence,
higher analyst following can reduce tax avoidance.
The analyst coverage can potentially affect the relationship between comparability
and tax avoidance. Analyst coverage increases the visibility of the firm and curbs
managerial opportunism, which can lead to a lower level of tax avoidance.
Comparability can influence tax avoidance in two ways. First, higher comparability
increases the transparency of financial information and improves the monitoring of
management, which leads to lower tax avoidance. Conversely, comparability also
increases the amount of analyst following. This effect also improves the monitoring
of managerial behaviours and increases the investors’ recognition, which leads to
higher tax risks (i.e., lower tax avoidance) for firms. Since both comparability and
analyst coverage reduce tax avoidance, they may complement each other and can
constrain tax avoidance even more. In other words, higher analyst coverage may
strengthen (complement) the relationship between comparability and tax avoidance
(De Franco et al., 2011). Since analysts also play an information (financial and nonfi-
nancial) production role (Bushman, 1989), they can act as substitutes for the financial
information environment (Lobo, Song, & Stanford, 2012). It is important to note that
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comparability is only valuable for financial information. However, analysts pay atten-
tion to financial and nonfinancial information, which makes them more informed.
Therefore, higher analyst coverage may decrease the usefulness of accounting infor-
mation (and also comparability) for the investors and other stakeholders. Hence, ana-
lyst coverage may weaken the effect of comparability on tax avoidance. This
discussion gives rise to the following alternative hypothesis:
H2: Higher analyst coverage strengthens (weakens) the negative relationship between
financial statement comparability and corporate tax avoidance. In other words, analyst
coverage complements (substitutes for) comparability in reducing tax avoidance.
2.2.3. Comparability, product market competition and tax avoidance
The preceding studies suggest that product market competition (competition here-
after) influences managerial decisions such as investments, cash holdings, financing
decisions, cash distributions and financial reporting practices (Akdogu & MacKay,
2012; Alimov, 2014; He, 2012; Byoun & Xu, 2016; Majeed & Zhang, 2016). In the
same way, competition can also influence the managerial decisions related to taxes.
The competition may affect tax avoidance in two ways. First, competition affects
managerial opportunism, which can influence tax avoidance activities. Earlier research
has provided the theoretical grounds that competition is a strong force that can act as
a governance mechanism and curtail managerial opportunism, thereby reducing
agency conflicts (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988). Several
recent studies have documented the disciplinary role of competition (Chen, Li, et al.,
2014; Mnasri & Ellouze, 2015; Majeed, Yan, & Tauni, 2018). Therefore, competition,
as an external disciplinary mechanism, would curtail the activities of the manage-
ment, such as tax avoidance, which may reduce the value of the firm (Chen, Li, et al.,
2014). Furthermore, higher competition can also increase the financial reporting qual-
ity and comparability (Majeed & Zhang, 2016; Majeed, Yan, et al., 2018), which
makes it more difficult to conceal the activities related to tax avoidance and may trig-
ger stricter regulatory actions. These arguments are in line with Kubick et al. (2015),
who suggest that it is market power (lower competition) that increases tax avoidance.
This discussion suggests a negative relationship between competition and tax avoid-
ance. Furthermore, competition together with comparability may reduce tax avoid-
ance even more. In other words, higher competition may strengthen (complement)
the relationship between comparability and tax avoidance.
However, on the other side, competitive pressure may also result in higher corpor-
ate tax avoidance (Cai & Liu, 2009). Prior studies have documented the ‘dark side of
competition’, which encourages the ‘all is fair’ mind set among firms when competi-
tion is higher (Shleifer, 2004; Zahra, 1994). Furthermore, several recent studies argued
that competition increases managerial opportunism (Rotemberg & Scharfstein, 1990;
Martin 1993; Horn, Lang, & Lundgren, 1994). Recent studies also suggest that compe-
tition encourages unethical behaviour and managerial opportunism, which leads to
the manipulation of financial reporting (Lee & Liu, 2014; Lin, Officer, & Zhan, 2015).
Therefore, higher competition resulting in higher managerial opportunism may
increase value destroying activities, such as tax avoidance. Therefore, a positive associ-
ation between competition and tax avoidance as reported in prior research (Cai &
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Liu, 2009; Gokalp, Lee, & Peng, 2017) is expected. Furthermore, higher competition
leading to higher tax avoidance may weaken the relationship between comparability
and tax avoidance. In view of these conflicting viewpoints, we present the follow-
ing hypothesis:
H3: Higher product market competition strengthens (weakens) the negative relationship
between financial statement comparability and corporate tax avoidance. In other words,




Our sample includes all A-listed, nonfinancial firms for the period from 2005 to 2014
in China. We obtain the data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database. Our sample period starts in 2005 because quarterly reporting in
China started in 2002 and our comparability measure requires 16 quarters of prior
data. Furthermore, the industries with less than 15 firm-year observations are
dropped to calculate the comparability since we use the top4/top10 ranks in the com-
parability measure. The industry classification used in our study is second-level classi-
fication of the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC). All of the continuous
variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% of their empirical distribution.
3.2. Dependent variable
We employ multiple proxies for the measurement of corporate tax avoidance, which
have been extensively used in the preceding literature (Chen et al., 2010; Blaylock
2016; Bauer 2016). Our first proxy is the effective tax rate (TA_RATE), which is cal-
culated as follows:
TARATE ¼ statutory tax rate  real tax rate
where the real tax rate (effective tax rate) ¼ income tax expenses/income before taxes.
A lower real tax rate means a higher degree of tax avoidance. However, Chinese listed
firms have considerable heterogeneity in their statutory tax rates which significantly
affects firms’ tax expenses. Therefore, it is important to control the effect of firms’
statutory tax rates. Our second proxy for the measurement of tax avoidance is the
book tax difference (TA_BTD), which is calculated as follows:
TABTD ¼ income before tax  taxable incomeð Þ=total assets
where taxable income ¼ (income tax expenses - deferred income tax expenses)/statu-
tory tax rate. TA_BTD reflects the difference between the accounting-based measure
of book income and the firms’ taxable income. A higher value of TA_BTD means
that firms’ taxable income is relatively small compared to its accounting income. This
represents that the firm might adopt aggressive tax planning strategies since the book
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tax gap may also be because of accounting accruals. Therefore, we construct the com-
ponent of the book-tax gap that is not influenced by accounting accruals as our third
measure of tax avoidance. Our third measure of tax avoidance is the adjusted book-
tax difference (TA_DDBTD) as measured by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) using the
following regression:
BTDi;t ¼ a TACCi;t þ li þ ei;t (1)
where BTD is the book-tax difference and TACC represents the total accruals, both
of which are scaled by total assets. li is the average value of the residual for firm i
over the sample period, and ei;t is the deviation in year t of firm i’s average residual.
The DDBTD is the sum of li and ei;t (i.e., the regression residual). Thus, higher val-
ues of TA_RATE, TA_BTD and TA_DDBTD represent a higher level of corporate
tax avoidance.
3.3. Independent variable
We follow the empirical approach of De Franco et al. (2011) for the estimation of the
firm-year level of comparability. This measure of comparability is based on the out-
put of the accounting system. If the accounting methods used by two firms are simi-
lar (identical), then for the same economic event, the output (the accounting
numbers; e.g., earnings) of the system should be similar for them. De Franco et al.
(2011) employ earnings and stock returns as proxies for the accounting output and
economic event, respectively. To gauge the accounting function of firm i, in each
year, we estimate the following regression using the quarterly data of the 16 previous
quarters:
Earningsit ¼ ai þ bi Returnit þ eit (2)
where Earningsit denotes the income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.
Returnit represents the stock returns during the quarter. We measure the accounting
function for firm i and the accounting function of another firm j with the estimated
coefficients of b̂i and b̂jrespectively. As the closeness of the functions between the
two firms increase, the comparability between the two firms also increases. To calcu-
late the closeness of the two accounting functions, we estimate firm i’s and firm j’s
accounting responses (predicted earnings) to the same economic event. In other
words, we estimate the returns of firms i and j using the above estimated coefficients
of b̂i and b̂j; respectively.
E Earningsð Þiit ¼ âi þ b̂iReturnit (3)
E Earningsð Þijt ¼ âj þ b̂jReturnit (4)
where E(Earnings)iit symbolises the predicted earnings of firm i and E(Earnings)ijt
symbolises the predicted earnings of firm j, with the stock return of firm i in period t
as the same economic event. When firms employ comparable accounting systems, the
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difference between two predicted earnings is smaller. Accordingly, we use the follow-









j E ðEarningsiitÞE ðEarningsijtÞj (4)
The comparability between firm i’s and firm j’s accounting systems is defined as the
negative value of the average absolute difference between the predicted earnings.
Therefore, the proxy for the comparability ComAccijt has nonpositive values. Higher
values indicate higher comparability. We estimate the comparability for each two
firms within the same industry and fiscal year. To get the firm-year level of the com-
parability measures, we rank all the values of ComAccijt for each firm i from the
highest to lowest within an industry. Our measures for the firm-year level of compar-
ability ComAcc4it or ComAcc10it are the mean value of the four or ten largest com-
parability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry, respectively.
3.4. Control variables
To control for other effects, we use several control variables in the regression model,
which may affect corporate tax avoidance. In addition to size, leverage, market-to-
book value and return on assets, we also control for fixed assets intensity, the level of
intangible assets, inventory intensity and ownership duality following prior research
(Bradshaw, Liao, & Ma, 2016; Chyz, Ching Leung, Zhen Li, & Meng Rui, 2013;
Higgins, Omer, & Phillips, 2015; Richardson, Wang, & Zhang, 2016). Preceding stud-
ies suggest that larger firms are more complex in nature and the costs of tax avoid-
ance are less (Rego, 2003). Earlier studies (Richardson et al., 2016) advocate that
leverage and fixed assets intensity are positively associated with tax avoidance. We
use market to book value and return on assets to control for growth and profitability.
We also control for inventory intensity because prior research proposes that inven-
tory intensive firms avoid less taxes than capital intensive firms (Stickney & McGee,
1982; Richardson et al., 2016). We control for CEO duality since Bradshaw et al.
(2016) suggest that the CEO/chairman of the board duality created agency problem is
less independent and hence increases tax avoidance. We employ the panel data model
and use the firm fixed effect model to empirically test our hypotheses.
3.5. Regression model
We use the panel data model to estimate the following equation to test the effect of
comparability on tax avoidance.
TAit ¼ b0 þ b1CompAccit þ b2Sizeit þ b3Levit þ b4ROAit þ b5MBit þ b6PPEit
þb7Intangit þ b8Inventit þ b9Dualit þ Firmþ Year þ eit (5)
where TAit represents tax avoidance as measured by the three proxies that were dis-
cussed in section 3.2, and CompAccit represents the proxies for comparability that
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were discussed in section 3.3. Sizeit is the natural log of assets and Levit represents
the leverage ratio. ROAit is the return on assets calculated as the net profits after tax-
ation divided by total assets. MBit is the market to book ratio calculated as the ratio
of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. ‘PPEit’ represents the fixed
assets intensity and is measured as the plant, property and equipment divided by total
assets, while Intangit is the intensity of intangible assets calculated as the intangible
assets divided by total assets. Inventit is the inventory intensity and is measured as
total inventories divided by total assets. Dualit represents CEO duality and is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO of the firm is also chairman of the
board and zero otherwise. Firm and year fixed effects are employed to control the
variations across firms and business cycles.
We use various constructs of this model to test our hypotheses regarding ana-
lyst coverage and product market competition on the relationship between com-
parability and tax avoidance. We introduce analyst coverage (ACit) and the
interaction term of analyst coverage and comparability (CompitACit) to test
our second hypothesis, where ACit is measured as the natural log of one plus the
number of analysts that follow firm i each year. We introduce product market
competition (PMCit) and the interaction term of product market competition
and comparability (CompitPMCit) to test our third hypothesis, where PMCit is
measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) multiplied by negative one.
The HHI has been widely used in recent studies (Majeed & Zhang, 2016;
Majeed, Zhang, & Wang, 2017). The HHI is quadratic sum of the market share
of firm i in an industry, where the market share is calculated as the net sales of
the firm divided by the net total sales of the industry to which that firm belongs.
Higher values of PMCit denote higher competition within an industry and
vice versa.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Summary of statistics and correlations
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, independent var-
iables and all the control variables. For corporate tax avoidance, we note that the
three proxies are slightly different, but the mean (median) values move slightly up or
down or not at all. In terms of the comparability, the mean (median) values of the
two proxies are about -0.897 and -1.237, respectively (-0.369 and -0.591, respectively),
which suggests that CompAcc4 is slightly larger than CompAcc10.
Table 2 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of the varia-
bles in our model. We note that the three tax avoidance proxies (TA_RATE,
TA_BTD and TA_DDBTD) are positively correlated with each other and the two
comparability proxies (CompAcc4 and CompAcc10) are also highly positively
correlated, which suggest that different measures of tax avoidance and compar-
ability are consistent. Meanwhile, tax avoidance proxies are all significantly and
negatively associated with comparability proxies. These results provide prelimin-
ary evidence that comparability may reduce tax avoidance. Most of the rest of the
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correlation coefficients have small values, which indicate that multicollinearity is
a nonissue.
4.2. Regression results: comparability and corporate tax avoidance
Table 3 reports the results examining the association between comparability and tax
avoidance. Our results suggest a negative and statistically significant relationship
(p< 0.01) between comparability and tax avoidance. The results remain consistent for
all of the measures of tax avoidance and comparability. These results support our first
hypothesis (H1) that comparability is negatively associated with tax avoidance. These
findings suggest that comparability improves the monitoring of managerial activities,
highlights the risks (e.g., political and reputational) that are associated with tax-
related activities and reduces the tax avoidance behaviour.
Our control variables are in line with the preceding studies. Our results report a
significantly positive association of ROA with tax avoidance in accordance with the
prior studies (Higgins et al., 2015; Allen et al., 2016). We also note a negative rela-
tionship for leverage and MB with tax avoidance (Allen and Francis, 2016; Chyz
et al., 2013). The results also show a negative association of inventory and a positive
association of intangibles intensity (Richardson et al., 2016; Allen et al., 2016) with
tax avoidance. All of our control variables are in accordance with the predictions in
the prior literature.
4.3. Comparability, analyst coverage and corporate tax avoidance
Table 4 reports the results for the effect of analyst coverage on the relationship
between comparability and tax avoidance. First, our results for the relationship
between analyst coverage and tax avoidance are positive but insignificant for
TA_RATE. However, the results are negative and highly significant for TA_BTD
and TA_DDBTD. These findings imply that analyst coverage reduces the tax
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variables N mean sd p50 min max skewness kurtosis
TA_RATE 16355 0.000 0.122 0.003 0.497 0.324 1.049 6.923
TA_BTD 16090 0.001 0.029 0.001 0.085 0.119 0.890 7.091
TA_DDBTD 16090 0.000 0.028 0.002 0.080 0.103 0.663 6.090
CompAcc4 13325 0.897 1.911 0.369 14.92 0.070 5.511 37.07
CompAcc10 13325 1.237 2.214 0.591 16.95 0.128 5.096 32.93
Size 19610 21.65 1.293 21.51 18.81 26.40 0.689 3.914
Lev 19610 0.482 0.260 0.476 0.048 1.656 1.152 6.690
ROA 19610 0.035 0.071 0.036 0.354 0.209 2.014 12.59
MB 18765 3.581 3.556 2.634 2.480 26.59 3.452 19.99
PPE 19610 0.253 0.181 0.217 0.002 0.760 0.748 2.914
Intang 19600 0.046 0.055 0.030 0 0.318 2.588 11.14
Invent 19596 0.165 0.153 0.128 0 0.745 1.789 6.489
Dual 18793 0.214 0.410 0 0 1 1.392 2.937
TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD represents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax differ-
ence. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in
period t in an industry respectively. Size I natural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents
return on total assets. MB represents market-to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed
assets). Intang represents intangible assets. Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality. All
continuous variables have been winsorised at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. Where.
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avoidance behaviours of the firms. The results are consistent with recent studies
(Allen et al., 2016) that suggest that the monitoring by analysts decreases the tax
avoidance behaviours of the firms.
Moreover, our results are all positive and highly significant for the interaction
terms of comparability and analyst coverage, Comp4AC and Comp10AC. These
interesting findings suggest that analyst coverage substitutes for the effect of compar-
ability in reducing corporate tax avoidance. The following arguments can be presented
for this phenomenon. Comparability deals with only the financial reporting aspect of
the firms but analyst coverage takes into account all the informational aspects of the
firm, including financial and nonfinancial aspects. When analyst coverage increases, the
benefits of comparability may be lower because higher analyst coverage provides add-
itional information to all stakeholders in an easy manner, which results in much lower
information asymmetry. Allen et al. (2016) note that analyst coverage not only
increases the flow of financial information but also increases the visibility of the firms
by enhancing investor recognition. If a firm is involved in risky activities, such as tax
avoidance, the potential reputational and political risks would be much higher because
of the greater visibility. Therefore, a substitution effect for analyst coverage is possible.
Table 3. Financial Statement Comparability and Corporate Tax Avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4 20.003** 20.001*** 20.001**
(22.55) (22.89) (22.41)
CompAcc10 20.003** 20.001*** 20.000**
(22.51) (22.63) (22.16)
Size 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.005
(2.41) (5.21) (6.34) (2.43) (5.25) (6.38)
Lev 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.000
(0.44) (0.87) (0.01) (0.44) (0.85) (0.03)
ROA 1.061 0.269 0.244 1.059 0.269 0.244
(22.53) (27.56) (25.59) (22.45) (27.49) (25.53)
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.39) (2.10) (1.89) (0.39) (2.07) (1.86)
PPE 0.014 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.001 0.004
(0.89) (0.19) (1.24) (0.88) (0.18) (1.22)
Intang 0.088 0.014 0.017 0.088 0.014 0.017
(2.31) (1.74) (2.15) (2.31) (1.75) (2.15)
Invent 0.054 0.004 0.010 0.054 0.004 0.010
(2.97) (0.99) (2.66) (2.97) (1.00) (2.67)
Dual 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.004
(1.65) (4.22) (4.04) (1.66) (4.22) (4.05)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.147 0.076 0.091 0.148 0.077 0.092
(1.92) (4.76) (5.81) (1.93) (4.79) (5.85)
Observations 10,522 10,403 10,403 10,522 10,403 10,403
R2 0.086 0.119 0.100 0.086 0.119 0.100
Firm Number 2,083 2,071 2,071 2,083 2,071 2,071
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., , Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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4.4. Comparability, product market competition and corporate tax avoidance
Table 5 reports the results for the effect of competition on the relationship between
comparability and tax avoidance. Our results suggest an insignificant association
between competition and tax avoidance. These results dispute the findings of Cai and
Liu (2009) that competition promotes tax avoidance (unethical) behaviours in
Chinese firms. Furthermore, our results also dispute the argument that competition
reduces the managerial opportunism, improves the governance quality (Majeed &
Zhang, 2016; Chen, Li, et al., 2014) and therefore results in lower tax avoidance.
Furthermore, our results for the interaction terms of comparability and competi-
tion, Comp4PMC and Comp10 PMC, are also insignificant. Thus, the results
suggest that competition dos not affect the relationship between comparability and
corporate tax avoidance.
Table 4. Comparability, Analyst Coverage and Corporate Tax Avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4 0.008 0.003 0.003
(2.65) (4.06) (3.94)
CompAcc10 0.007 0.003 0.003
(2.86) (4.43) (4.32)
AC 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.001
(4.24) (1.96) (1.86) (4.44) (1.46) (1.35)
Comp43AC 0.004** 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.31) (2.92) (3.04)
Comp103AC 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.69) (3.63) (3.77)
Size 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005
(1.55) (3.36) (4.37) (1.51) (3.31) (4.31)
Lev 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.28) (0.13) (0.85) (0.27) (0.12) (0.84)
ROA 0.766 0.245 0.223 0.770 0.247 0.225
(15.81) (20.40) (18.90) (15.82) (20.42) (18.95)
MB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.34) (3.27) (2.81) (1.32) (3.24) (2.78)
PPE 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002
(0.34) (0.14) (0.55) (0.33) (0.17) (0.52)
Intang 0.052 0.024 0.027 0.052 0.023 0.027
(1.26) (2.31) (2.69) (1.25) (2.29) (2.67)
Invent 0.031 0.001 0.007 0.031 0.000 0.007
(1.42) (0.10) (1.36) (1.43) (0.07) (1.39)
Dual 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.006
(1.88) (4.52) (4.50) (1.87) (4.53) (4.51)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.107 0.071 0.091 0.101 0.069 0.089
(1.17) (3.13) (4.11) (1.11) (3.05) (4.02)
Observations 7,674 7,601 7,601 7,674 7,601 7,601
R2 0.085 0.109 0.081 0.085 0.109 0.082
Firm Number 1,867 1,852 1,852 1,867 1,852 1,852
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., , Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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4.5. Additional test: Controlling for the effect other factors
To provide credence to the argument that comparability reduces the tax avoidance
behaviour of the firm, we further control for certain other factors that may influ-
ence corporate tax avoidance, such as earnings quality, state ownership and own-
ership concentration. Financial reporting is not only an important tool for
management to convey the performance of the firm but also helps in governance
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Prior studies also suggest that financial reporting quality
reduces information asymmetry and thus can potentially reduce the managerial
slack (Bauwhede, De Meyere, & Van Cauwenberge, 2015). Therefore, it is expected
that financial reporting quality may also reduce tax avoidance. Frank et al. (2009)
suggest that absolute discretionary accruals (a measure of earnings quality and
aggressive financial reporting quality) are positively associated with tax avoidance.
Table 5. Comparability, Product Market Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4 0.004 0.001 0.001
(-2.45) (-2.75) (-2.19)
CompAcc10 0.003 0.001 0.001
(-2.50) (-2.54) (-1.99)
PMC 0.078 0.002 0.005 0.075 0.002 0.004
(1.77) (0.21) (0.51) (1.70) (0.17) (0.48)
Comp43 PMC -0.007 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.57)
Comp103 PMC -0.007 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.96) (-0.84) (-0.56)
Size 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.005
(-2.39) (-5.21) (-6.34) (-2.41) (-5.25) (-6.37)
Lev 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.000
(-0.44) (-0.90) (-0.00) (-0.45) (-0.88) (0.02)
ROA 1.061 0.269 0.244 1.059 0.269 0.244
(22.54) (27.56) (25.59) (22.47) (27.48) (25.53)
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.33) (-2.12) (-1.92) (0.33) (-2.09) (-1.88)
PPE 0.014 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.001 0.004
(0.88) (0.17) (1.23) (0.87) (0.16) (1.21)
Intang 0.089 0.014 0.017 0.089 0.014 0.017
(2.34) (1.76) (2.16) (2.34) (1.76) (2.16)
Invent 0.054 0.004 0.010 0.053 0.004 0.010
(-2.94) (-0.98) (-2.65) (-2.93) (-0.99) (-2.66)
Dual 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.004
(-1.70) (-4.22) (-4.06) (-1.70) (-4.23) (-4.06)
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.153 0.077 0.092 0.154 0.077 0.092
(2.00) (4.77) (5.83) (2.01) (4.80) (5.86)
Observations 10,522 10,403 10,403 10,522 10,403 10,403
R2 0.087 0.119 0.100 0.087 0.119 0.100
Firm Number 2,083 2,071 2,071 2,083 2,071 2,071
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality. , Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Prior studies also suggest that a large number of firms in China are state owned
enterprises (SOEs) (Wu, Gao, Chen, & Li, 2016). These SOEs face agency conflicts
between majority and minority shareholders in addition to the agency conflict
between management and shareholders (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007). These
SOEs, due to support from the state, are considered to have lower levels of risk by
lenders (Chen, Chen, Lobo, et al., 2010; Faccio, 2006). The objectives of SOEs are
also different from non-state-owned enterprises (NSEOs); therefore, the risks faced by
these firms are also different (Majeed, Yan, et al., 2018). The SOEs are also given
preferential treatment by the big four banks, which are major sources of financing in
China and are also owned by the state. SOEs face fewer financial constraints com-
pared to NSOEs. Therefore, SOEs have fewer incentives to avoid taxes. Bradshaw
et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence to support this argument and report that
Table 6. Financial Statement Comparability and Corporate Tax Avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4 20.002 20.001*** 20.001**
(21.80) (22.98) (22.44)
CompAcc10 20.002 20.001** 20.000**
(21.64) (22.57) (22.05)
Size 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.006
(2.98) (5.91) (6.92) (3.01) (5.96) (6.96)
Lev 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001
(0.33) (0.74) (0.18) (0.35) (0.70) (0.23)
ROA 1.075 0.262 0.241 1.074 0.262 0.241
(21.68) (25.28) (23.80) (21.63) (25.22) (23.75)
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.03) (2.76) (2.39) (0.04) (2.71) (2.34)
PPE 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.003
(0.86) (0.03) (0.92) (0.85) (0.04) (0.90)
Intang 0.088 0.014 0.017 0.088 0.014 0.017
(2.11) (1.57) (1.97) (2.11) (1.58) (1.98)
Invent 0.055 0.003 0.009 0.056 0.003 0.009
(2.95) (0.73) (2.20) (2.96) (0.74) (2.22)
Dual 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.004
(1.47) (3.81) (3.63) (1.47) (3.82) (3.63)
ABS_DA 0.026 0.002 0.009 0.026 0.002 0.009
(1.94) (0.87) (3.25) (1.94) (0.86) (3.24)
SOE 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.001
(1.34) (0.22) (0.36) (1.34) (0.21) (0.35)
Top1 0.023 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.007
(1.08) (1.56) (1.62) (1.09) (1.58) (1.64)
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.203 0.093 0.107 0.205 0.094 0.107
(2.53) (5.50) (6.44) (2.55) (5.54) (6.48)
Observations 9,601 9,529 9,529 9,601 9,529 9,529
R2 0.089 0.118 0.096 0.089 0.117 0.096
Firm Number 1,910 1,903 1,903 1,910 1,903 1,903
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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state ownership is negatively associated with tax avoidance in China. The prior lit-
erature also suggests that ownership concentration increases the incentives of own-
ers to effectively monitor the managerial behaviours and curtails the managerial
opportunism (Ataay, 2018). In line with this argument, Richardson et al. (2016)
proposes that ownership concentration influences the tax avoidance behaviour of
the firms.
Considering the above discussion, we add three more control variables into our
regression model. Earning quality is measured by the absolute discretionary accruals
Table 7. Comparability, Analyst Coverage and Corporate Tax Avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4 0.010 0.003 0.003
(3.29) (4.17) (4.13)
CompAcc10 0.009 0.003 0.003
(3.41) (4.53) (4.52)
AC 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.001
(4.85) (1.71) (1.67) (5.04) (1.20) (1.14)
Comp43AC 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.88) (3.07) (3.20)
Comp103AC 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.19) (3.82) (4.00)
Size 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.004
(1.58) (3.23) (4.07) (1.54) (3.16) (4.00)
Lev 0.008 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.003
(0.44) (0.07) (0.81) (0.45) (0.07) (0.81)
ROA 0.779 0.241 0.222 0.785 0.243 0.224
(15.33) (18.98) (17.82) (15.36) (19.04) (17.90)
MB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.75) (3.35) (2.80) (0.73) (3.32) (2.77)
PPE 0.015 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.002
(0.89) (0.02) (0.59) (0.89) (0.05) (0.57)
Intang 0.055 0.023 0.025 0.055 0.023 0.025
(1.23) (2.07) (2.34) (1.23) (2.06) (2.32)
Invent 0.028 0.000 0.007 0.029 0.000 0.007
(1.26) (0.04) (1.21) (1.28) (0.00) (1.25)
Dual 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.005
(1.29) (4.03) (4.02) (1.28) (4.03) (4.02)
ABS_DA 0.016 0.001 0.006 0.016 0.001 0.006
(1.19) (0.20) (1.82) (1.20) (0.19) (1.83)
SOE 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.002
(1.29) (0.90) (0.81) (1.29) (0.91) (0.82)
Top1 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.008 0.007
(0.65) (1.26) (1.16) (0.61) (1.24) (1.13)
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.110 0.070 0.088 0.105 0.068 0.086
(1.17) (3.00) (3.83) (1.11) (2.91) (3.73)
Observations 7,097 7,060 7,060 7,097 7,060 7,060
R2 0.095 0.111 0.081 0.095 0.111 0.081
Firm Number 1,739 1,730 1,730 1,739 1,730 1,730
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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(ABS_DAit) that are used in most studies. SOEit is a dummy variable that is equal to
one if firms are SOEs and zero otherwise. Ownership concentration is measured as
the proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholder (Top1it). Tables 6, 7 and 8
reports the new results, respectively. All results remain consistent with the results that
were reported in the previous part. Comparability is negatively associated with cor-
porate tax avoidance. Analyst coverage substitutes for the effect of comparability on
tax avoidance while competition insignificant affects the relationship between com-
parability and tax avoidance.
Table 8. Comparability, Product Market Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4 0.003 0.000 0.000
(1.48) (1.06) (0.56)
CompAcc10 0.003 0.000 0.000
(1.57) (0.94) (0.48)
PMC 0.063 0.012 0.007 0.057 0.012 0.007
(1.03) (0.94) (0.55) (0.91) (0.89) (0.51)
Comp43 PMC 20.012 0.004 0.005
(20.52) (0.90) (1.12)
Comp103 PMC 20.014 0.003 0.004
(20.75) (0.80) (0.97)
Size 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.006
(2.92) (5.97) (6.97) (2.94) (6.02) (7.02)
Lev 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001
(0.33) (0.74) (0.19) (0.34) (0.70) (0.23)
ROA 1.075 0.262 0.241 1.075 0.262 0.241
(21.68) (25.25) (23.76) (21.63) (25.19) (23.71)
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (2.70) (2.32) (0.01) (2.66) (2.29)
PPE 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.003
(0.87) (0.04) (0.91) (0.86) (0.05) (0.90)
Intang 0.088 0.014 0.017 0.088 0.014 0.017
(2.12) (1.56) (1.97) (2.12) (1.58) (1.98)
Invent 0.055 0.003 0.009 0.055 0.003 0.009
(2.93) (0.75) (2.23) (2.93) (0.76) (2.24)
Dual 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.004
(1.49) (3.78) (3.60) (1.50) (3.79) (3.60)
ABS_DA 0.026 0.002 0.009 0.026 0.002 0.009
(1.95) (0.86) (3.24) (1.94) (0.84) (3.22)
SOE 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.001
(1.34) (0.21) (0.35) (1.34) (0.20) (0.34)
Top1 0.023 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.007
(1.08) (1.57) (1.63) (1.09) (1.58) (1.64)
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.203 0.093 0.107 0.204 0.094 0.108
(2.53) (5.51) (6.46) (2.53) (5.55) (6.50)
Observations 9,601 9,529 9,529 9,601 9,529 9,529
R2 0.089 0.118 0.097 0.089 0.118 0.096
Firm Number 1,910 1,903 1,903 1,910 1,903 1,903
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively,.
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5. Robustness check
5.1. Alternative measures of comparability
As a robustness test, we first use alternative measures of comparability. We employ
two more measures of comparability. First, we consider the asymmetric timeliness of
earnings in our measure of comparability, as illustrated in Basu (1997). For that pur-
pose, we introduce a dummy variable for negative stock returns and an interaction
term of the dummy variable and stock returns in Equation (2). While using alterna-
tive measures of comparability, we introduce time, industry and regional fixed effects
Table 9. Financial Statement Comparability and Tax Avoidance Using Alternative Measure of
Comparability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
Model 1 Model 1
CompAcc4_adj 20.005*** 20.001*** 20.001***
(24.82) (25.01) (24.74)
CompAcc10_adj 20.005*** 20.001*** 20.001***
(24.65) (24.97) (24.72)
Region/Industry/Year are Included
Observations 10,522 10,403 10,403 10,522 10,403 10,403
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.111 0.106 0.093 0.111 0.106
Model 2 Model 2
CompAcc4_adj 0.009 0.002 0.002
(4.13) (3.90) (3.91)
CompAcc10_adj 0.009 0.002 0.002
(4.52) (4.32) (4.33)
AC 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
(1.36) (5.19) (5.11) (1.72) (4.65) (4.57)
Comp4AC 0.004*** 0.001 0.001
(2.63) (1.52) (1.58)
Comp10AC 0.004*** 0.001** 0.001**
(3.17) (2.04) (2.09)
Region/Industry/Year are Included
Observations 7,674 7,601 7,601 7,674 7,601 7,601
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.132 0.126 0.098 0.133 0.126
Model 3 Model 3
CompAcc4_adj 0.007 0.002 0.002
(4.27) (5.10) (4.68)
CompAcc10_adj 0.006 0.002 0.001
(4.12) (5.02) (4.62)
PMC 0.034 0.014 0.014 0.035 0.014 0.014
(1.90) (2.95) (3.04) (1.88) (2.93) (3.01)
Comp4 PMC 20.011 20.003*** 20.003***
(21.86) (22.97) (22.64)
Comp10 PMC 20.010 20.003*** 20.003**
(21.74) (22.77) (22.49)
Region/Industry/Year are Included
Observations 10,522 10,403 10,403 10,522 10,403 10,403
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.112 0.107 0.094 0.112 0.107
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., , Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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in order to capture the variations across industries, regions and business cycles. The
results are reported in Table 9, and the conclusions still hold.
Prior research documents that stock prices incorporate firm-specific news before
they are reported in accounting earnings, which means that ‘prices lead earnings’
(Collins, Kothari, Shanken, & Sloan, 1994). Following De Franco et al. (2011), we
also use lagged stock returns in Equation (2) while estimating the comparability
measure so that accounting earnings are tied to lagged stock returns. Table 10 reports
the results for this alternative measure of comparability and the conclusions still
Table 10. Financial Statement Comparability and Tax Avoidance Using Alternative Measure of
Comparability’.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
Model 1 Model 1
CompAcc4_ple 20.005*** 20.001*** 20.001***
(25.30) (24.84) (24.59)
CompAcc10_ple 20.005*** 20.001*** 20.001***
(25.15) (24.77) (24.55)
Region/Industry/Year are Included
Observations 10,522 10,403 10,403 10,522 10,403 10,403
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.110 0.105 0.094 0.110 0.106
Model 2 Model 2
CompAcc4_ple 0.009 0.002 0.002
(4.17) (3.86) (3.89)
CompAcc10_ple 0.008 0.002 0.002
(4.47) (4.26) (4.29)
AC 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(1.00) (5.58) (5.53) (1.33) (5.04) (4.98)
Comp4AC 0.003** 0.000 0.000
(2.53) (1.12) (1.16)
Comp10AC 0.003*** 0.001 0.001
(3.04) (1.72) (1.75)
Region/Industry/Year are Included
Observations 7,674 7,601 7,601 7,674 7,601 7,601
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.132 0.126 0.098 0.133 0.126
Model 3 Model 3
CompAcc4_ple 0.007 0.002 0.001
(4.73) (4.65) (4.23)
CompAcc10_ple 0.006 0.001 0.001
(4.59) (4.57) (4.17)
PMC 0.031 0.012 0.012 0.032 0.012 0.013
(1.79) (2.67) (2.76) (1.79) (2.65) (2.73)
Comp4 PMC 20.011 20.003 20.002
(21.78) (21.88) (21.54)
Comp10 PMC 20.009 20.002 20.002
(21.73) (21.87) (21.54)
Region/Industry/Year are Included
Observations 10,522 10,403 10,403 10,522 10,403 10,403
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.112 0.107 0.094 0.111 0.107
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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remain consistent with the exception of the effect of competition on the relationship
between comparability and tax avoidance. Our results (untabulated) remain consistent
when we estimate our model using firm and year fixed effects.
5.2. Using alternative methodological approaches
We use alternative approaches to take into account the endogeneity concerns while
examining effect of comparability on corporate tax avoidance. Preceding studies (e.g.,
Aschhoff & Schmidt, 2008; Stiebale 2011; Clemens, Redelet, & Bhavnani, 2012)
employ a lag of the test variables to deal with the endogeneity concerns. Following
their approach, we take the first lag of the measures of comparability (i.e.,
CompAcc4_lag and CompAcc10_lag, respectively) and re-estimate the regressions.
Our results that are reported in Table 11 are consistent with those that were previ-
ously reported. Our results remain consistent when we use the second lag of our test
variable and re-estimate the results.
Table 11. Financial Statement Comparability and Tax Avoidance Using Lagged
Comparability Values.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4_lag 20.009*** 20.002*** 20.002***
(27.70) (25.96) (25.62)
CompAcc10_lag 20.008*** 20.002*** 20.001***
(27.71) (26.04) (25.68)
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.75) (1.60) (1.65) (0.67) (1.65) (1.70)
Lev 0.027 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.002 0.001
(1.95) (0.65) (0.39) (1.96) (0.68) (0.42)
ROA 0.666 0.168 0.153 0.661 0.167 0.152
(12.40) (9.70) (9.29) (12.24) (9.63) (9.23)
MB 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.29) (3.04) (3.03) (0.24) (3.10) (3.09)
PPE 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.005
(0.69) (0.48) (1.43) (0.70) (0.49) (1.41)
Intang 0.106 0.025 0.019 0.106 0.025 0.019
(3.08) (3.20) (2.53) (3.07) (3.20) (2.53)
Invent 0.100 0.026 0.028 0.101 0.026 0.028
(5.90) (6.25) (7.04) (5.92) (6.26) (7.06)
Dual 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.85) (0.75) (0.68) (0.82) (0.77) (0.70)
Region Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.062 0.010 0.000 0.060 0.011 0.001
(1.40) (0.86) (0.04) (1.36) (0.89) (0.07)
Observations 8,930 8,843 8,843 8,930 8,843 8,843
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.123 0.121 0.105 0.123 0.121
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 12. Financial Statement Comparability and Tax Avoidance Using Structure
Equation Regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD TA_RATE TA_BTD TA_DDBTD
CompAcc4 20.039*** 20.006** 20.003
(23.47) (22.53) (21.24)
CompAcc10 20.030*** 20.005** 20.002
(23.05) (22.37) (21.01)
Size 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(1.01) (1.27) (1.34) (0.51) (1.66) (1.50)
Lev 0.061 0.007 0.001 0.057 0.006 0.001
(3.54) (1.69) (0.36) (3.22) (1.60) (0.20)
ROA 0.464 0.126 0.127 0.445 0.121 0.126
(7.68) (9.15) (9.59) (6.37) (7.52) (8.18)
MB 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
(2.94) (3.97) (2.75) (2.61) (3.81) (2.51)
PPE 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.006
(0.56) (0.11) (2.83) (0.33) (0.38) (2.61)
Intang 0.085 0.024 0.016 0.089 0.025 0.017
(3.06) (3.81) (2.61) (3.18) (3.94) (2.73)
Invent 0.085 0.025 0.026 0.088 0.025 0.027
(7.00) (8.91) (9.90) (7.17) (9.01) (9.90)
Dual 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000
(2.47) (0.55) (0.63) (2.52) (0.48) (0.58)
Region Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.066 0.002 0.006 0.052 0.000 0.005
(1.90) (0.32) (0.86) (1.49) (0.02) (0.70)
Observations 8,280 8,233 8,233 8,280 8,233 8,233
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.078 0.101 0.026 0.081 0.103







ABS_DA 0.339 0.378 0.378 0.443 0.483 0.446
(2.66) (2.87) (2.87) (2.89) (3.08) (2.88)
ROA 3.354 3.699 3.699 5.537 5.997 5.347
(5.35) (5.53) (5.53) (7.47) (7.58) (8.29)
STD_Sales 0.551 0.504 0.504 0.563 0.495 0.491
(6.15) (5.79) (5.79) (5.29) (4.79) (4.81)
Size 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.003 0.003 0.008
(1.41) (1.23) (1.23) (0.15) (0.16) (0.46)
Lev 1.200 1.188 1.188 1.427 1.427 1.440
(12.62) (13.10) (13.10) (12.74) (13.31) (13.71)
MB 0.089 0.108 0.157 0.087 0.104 0.154
(15.56) (15.94) (18.47) (13.95) (13.98) (16.46)
Inst 0.491 0.515 0.515 0.632 0.651 0.671
(4.48) (4.59) (4.59) (4.82) (4.87) (5.09)
Big4 0.153 0.151 0.151 0.172 0.168 0.141
(2.92) (2.82) (2.82) (2.74) (2.64) (2.25)
Region Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.039 0.130 0.154 0.575 0.661 0.687
(0.12) (0.40) (0.47) (1.48) (1.70) (1.79)
Observations 8,280 8,233 8,233 8,280 8,233 8,233
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.126 0.135 0.146 0.130 0.154
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. TA_RATE is effective tax rate, TA_BTD repre-
sents book tax difference, TA_DDBTD represents adjusted book tax difference. ComAcc4it /ComAcc10it are the mean
value of four/ten largest comparability scores (ComAcctijt) of firm i in period t in an industry respectively. Size I nat-
ural log of total assets. Lev represents leverage ratio. ROA represents return on total assets. MB represents market-
to-book ratio. PPE represents property, plant and equipment (fixed assets). Intang represents intangible assets.
Invent represents inventory intensity. Dual represents CEO duality., Indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values at 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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To deal with reverse causality issues, we further employ a structural equation
regression as an alternative approach as discussed in earlier studies (Gow, Larcker, &
Reiss, 2016; Heckman & Pinto, 2015). We estimate the following simultaneous equa-
tions. Equation (6a) is the same as Equation (5), while Equation (6b) shows whether
and how tax avoidance and other factors influence comparability. Referring to previ-
ous studies, in Equation (6b), STD_Salesit represents the performance volatility
(which is calculated as the three year standard deviation of sales), Instit is the owner-
ship proportion of institutional investors, Big4it is a dummy variable that is equal to
one if firms are audited by the big four accounting firms and zero otherwise, and
other variables are the same as defined earlier. The results of the structural equations
that are reported in Table 12 are consistent with our results that were reported ear-
lier.
TAit ¼ b0 þ b1CompAccit þ b2Sizeit þ b3Levit þ b4ROAit þ b5MBit þ b6PPEit
þb7Intangit þ b8Inventit þ b9Dualit þ Regionþ Industryþ Year þ eit (6a)
CompAccit ¼ a0 þ a1TAit þ a2ABSDAit þ a3ROAit þ a4STDSalesit þ a5Sizeit þ a6Levit
þa7MBit þ a8Instit þ a9Big4it þ Regionþ Industryþ Year þ eit
(6b)
6. Conclusions
Although taxes play an important role in corporate decisions, the effect of financial
statement comparability on corporate tax avoidance has been overlooked in the
accounting and tax literature. Our study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by
investigating whether comparability is associated with the tax strategies of firms.
Given that the comparability influences the corporate information environment, we
expect this lower information asymmetry to improve the monitoring of managerial
activities (the stewardship role of accounting), thus leading to lower tax avoidance.
We posit that lower information asymmetry that is induced by higher comparability
reduces managerial opportunism, thus leading to lower managerial involvement in
value destroying activities (such as tax avoidance). Furthermore, higher transparency
makes the tax strategies of the firms more visible and hence increases the regulatory,
political and reputational risks faced by the firms.
Using numerous measures of financial statement comparability and corporate tax
avoidance, we document that comparability decreases the tax avoidance in Chinese
listed firms. Our results also suggest that analyst coverage substitutes for the effect
of comparability in reducing corporate tax avoidance. However, we do not find any
conclusive results regarding the effect of competition, corporate tax avoidance and
the relationship between comparability and tax avoidance. Our results are robust to
alternative measures of comparability. We also address the endogeneity concerns by
using the lagged values of test variables and the structural equation regres-
sion model.
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Essentially, our study offers distinctive insights into the relationship between com-
parability and corporate tax avoidance. By doing so, our study contributes to the
growing literature on the determinants of tax avoidance. Our findings also add to the
preceding literature on the effects of comparability. The findings of our study may
also be valuable to tax authorities in identifying the mechanisms that deter corporate
tax avoidance. Furthermore, our study lends academic credence to the call for more
transparency in the corporate sector to fight corporate tax avoidance. However, our
study has certain limitations as well. First, our sample is drawn from all A-listed
Chinese companies. The Chinese institutional environment is unique in nature and
the results of our study may not be generalised to other economies. Future research
into comparability and corporate tax avoidance in different economic settings may
augment our understanding of the relationship between comparability and tax strat-
egies. Moreover, the effects of the ownership structure, changing regulatory regimes,
firms’ life cycles and business strategies, etc. may also change the effect of compar-
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